Handbook

Security posture and `.lenses-local` writes

Lenses deliberately defaults to 127.0.0.1 binding (--bind-all-interfaces is opt-in and logs a scary banner). Sensitive writes land in /.lenses-local/ (sessions, FTS DB, Wizard state, telemetry). Shared GitHub…

Security posture and .lenses-local writes

What it is

Lenses deliberately defaults to 127.0.0.1 binding (--bind-all-interfaces is opt-in and logs a scary banner). Sensitive writes land in <workspace>/.lenses-local/ (sessions, FTS DB, Wizard state, telemetry). Shared GitHub overlays store under .lenses-repo/<login>/… once GitHub PAT auth succeeds.

Widening binds or automation flags forks into OIDC prerequisites versus rollback

When to revisit this checklist

Before enabling LENSES_ALLOW_ACTIONS or LENSES_ALLOW_GIT_ACTIONS, before widening bind surfaces, and before attaching reverse proxies that expose /studio/ or /api/ beyond trusted networks.

Key controls

Control Meaning
Loopback default Keeps POST surfaces (LLM provider saves, Wizard refine, Fleet probes) unreachable from LAN accidentally.
LENSES_ALLOW_ACTIONS=1 Opt-in WAN/LAN privilege — still requires GitHub / OIDC session for destructive flows.
LENSES_ALLOW_GIT_ACTIONS=1 Permits scripted git + tool runner POST remotely — treat like sharing your shell history.
RBAC file lenses-access.json Per-project scopes + auditing once bootstrapped.

High-risk variables are listed in docs/strategy/env-matrix.yaml and explained in Configuration reference.

Focused enterprise pages

Detailed sections moved for clarity — start at Enterprise hub for binding, OIDC, allowlists, LLM boundaries, Fleet, and backup/upgrade.

Verification

  1. Run ss -lptn sport = :8080 → expect loopback-only binds unless intentionally widened.
  2. Inspect ~/.lenses-local/governance-audit.jsonl after policy edits — tamper-evident-ish trail.
  3. Cross-check the HTTP API route catalog and the long-form HTTP narrative on GitHub whenever OIDC knobs or Fleet probes change.

What to do next